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Foreword 
Lifestyles are important determinants of resource consumption, energy needs, 
and environmental impacts. It is easy to agree on the importance of con-
sumer behavior and lifestyles for energy requirements, both in terms of en-
ergy services demand as well as how these translate into actual energy use 
(i.e., the issue of energy end-use efficiencies). It is however, much more diffi-
cult to come to grips with an analytical understanding of heterogeneity and 
the multitude of "hidden" dynamics that are so characteristic of differences 
and changes in consumption and energy end-use patterns. 
This paper by Thomas Buttner and Arnulf Griibler provides multiple 
perspectives on issues, research questions, and illustrative analytical routes 
that lead toward a better understanding of evolving consumption patterns. 
The cohort, or generational perspective developed in the paper is also a 
much welcome complement to the more traditional approaches in describing 
heterogeneity in consumer preferences and choices that have, to date, largely 
focussed on differences in income or family status. 
The paper describes an important part of the background research within 
the ECS project required as input to scenario development, modeling, and 
environmental impact assessment of long-term energy perspectives. The 
paper illustrates the need to extend traditional disciplinary boundaries when 
analyzing the interrelationships between human choices, energy, and the 
environment. The collaborative work reported here was initiated at IIASA 
and demonstrates the Institute's comparative strength and interdisciplinary 
role. 
Nebojsa Nakicenovic 
Project Leader 
Environmentally Compatible Energy Strategies (ECS) 
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The Birth of a "Green" Generation? 
Generational Dynamics of Resource 
Consumption Patterns 
THOMAS BUTTNER AND ARNULF GRUBLER 
ABSTRACT 
The article discusses a generational perspective on changes in lifestyle and consumption patterns that comple-
ment more-traditional approaches of heterogeneity and path dependency of human behavior. An application 
is given, in developing a model of cohort and gender-specific diffusion of technological artifacts, applied to the 
case of car ownership in Germany. The article concludes with a number of research questions to address the 
complexities of changes in human behavior from an interdisciplinary perspective. 
Introduction 
Global (environmental) change has revived interest in lifestyle and resource 
consumption patterns and their rates of change, both past and future. Traditional 
concerns about the physical and economic availability of resources have given way to 
an increasing awareness of global and long-term environmental impacts of resource 
consumption. Thus, although perceptions about ultimate constraints limiting prevailing 
growth trends have changed, the driving forces are still the same: population increase, 
along with social and economic development (i.e., a rise in per capita consumption). 
Often the human dimension of global change tends to be reduced to the issue of 
population growth. From a quantitative perspective, however, per capita consumption 
levels and resulting environmental impacts continue to dominate stresses on the global 
commons, and are likely to prevail over population growth proper for several decades 
to come. Currently about 200Jo of the world's population generate and consume over 
80% of global economic output, use three-quarters of commercial energy, and two-thirds 
of major bulk materials. For instance, there is a factor ten difference in the average per 
capita energy consumption between the developed (7 KWyr/capita (kilowatt-year/year 
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Fig. 1. Changes in the structure of energy end use by sector/human activity for Germany. Source: 
Schipper et al., 1989 (40]. 
per capita)] and the developing countries (0.7 KWyr/capita). These differences are even 
larger between individual countries or between different social strata within/between 
countries: for instance the per capita commercial energy consumption can differ by a 
factor of 140 between countries like the USA (10.3 kWyr/capita) and Bangladesh (0.07 
kWyr/capita). 
Demographic changes play an important role in shaping the level and structure 
of demand and resource consumption. Relevant demographic changes include natural 
population growth (balance between fertility and mortality), migration (balance between 
in-migration and out-migration), and changes in the (age) structure of the population. 
Finally, not only growth rates matter, but also distributional issues like rural versus urban 
residence, income, educational attainment, and so on. These demographic changes hold 
important- yet different- implications on resource consumption in both developing 1 and 
industrialized countries. In the latter, natural growth rates are low (sometimes even 
negative), but because of high per capita consumption levels, even small increases in 
population size can translate into sizable additions to the global resource balance. 
In the future, however, structural effects are likely to be a more powerful force of 
change. There are two main reasons for this: first, longer life expectancy and the changing 
composition of the population toward the elderly; second, the increasing importance of 
residential, service, and leisure-related activities and consumption. In "postindustrial" 
societies, lifestyles and private consumption have become more forceful agents of global 
change than industry. For example, over the last 40 years the share of industry in final 
energy consumption in Germany declined from two-thirds to one-third, with private and 
service sector consumption rising accordingly (Figure 1). Particularly personal transpor-
tation energy-demand growth has been vigorous, especially due to increasing car ownership 
rates and increased mobility levels (higher usage rates of automobiles). 
The implications of the progressive "greying" of the population in industrialized 
countries on structure and types of demands for services and goods remain largely open 
1 We acknowledge the critical importance of demographic factors on consumption in developing countries. 
In this paper however, we concentrate on industrialized countries. 
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questions. 2 Are older people "preserving" their consumption habits, or do new forms of 
social behavior become also adopted within older generations? What are the possible 
dynamics in the adoption of new consumption preferences? Are we anticipating what 
the possible effects might be, once one-third or more of car drivers will be over age 60? 
The present paper is an attempt to illustrate particularly how such phenomena could be 
described and what could be illustrative implications on future resource consumption 
levels (i.e., energy consumption). 
There is yet another reason to be interested in lifestyles. Further improvements in 
the quality of service, rendered by social infrastructures from health care to 
transportation, will increasingly be driven by individual consumer decisions, rather than 
from socially determined measures (e.g., massive public expenditures and infrastructure 
programs). Thus, for instance, the marginal improvement possibilities of public health 
care systems (e.g., in terms of contributing to further increases in life expectancy) may 
well depend more on an individual's decisions concerning food diet, smoking, physical 
fitness, etc., than on further increases in infrastructures and expenditures in curative3 
health measures. Along a similar vein, one can argue that the marginal utility gains of 
public investments in transport systems (e.g., to combat congestion) are less than those 
from individual-determined usage decisions (e.g., use a car more intelligently and 
selectively) of existing systems. This not only applies to the marginal utility gains, but 
even more so to the respective costs of improving quality of service. 
Understanding how lifestyle and resource consumption patterns have evolved, along 
with identifying their dynamics, driving forces, and possible leverage for policies 
furthering changes, are preconditions for discussing the human dimensions of global 
environmental change [15, 16, 29) and subsequent policy analysis. Lifestyles are not 
intrinsically given. Nor do they evolve autonomously, or can they be separated from the 
social, economic, and even natural environment in which people live. As a result, lifestyle 
patterns are highly heterogeneous: over time, across different social strata, and between 
different countries. This is well recognized in research fields as diverse as microeconomics 
[2], family life-cycle analysis [9], or marketing research [6, 49). Such analysis, however, 
in our viewpoint, often has an important limitation: the inference from cross-sectional 
observations to longitudinal projections. For instance, consumption patterns in high-income 
groups do not necessarily give an adequate indication of future changes in consumption 
patterns of low-income groups. Along a similar vein, a cross-sectional life-cycle analysis 
can show how consumption patterns differ between the young and the old. But how do 
we know if, and to what extent, today's young will adopt the consumption styles of the 
presently old, once they are of similar age? Or, could it rather be that tomorrow's old 
will maintain their "young" consumption patterns? 
MOTIVATION 
The objective of this paper is not to develop a new theory of lifestyle formation or 
changing consumption patterns. Instead we aim to complement more traditional 
perspectives from the fields of economics and demography on the heterogeneity of lifestyle 
and consumption patterns from the perspective of generational or cohort dynamics. In 
fact, we argue that in a number of instances, changes in lifestyle patterns that appear 
at first sight as surprise and discontinuity, can be related to cohort phenomena. Thus, 
it is important to differentiate between period, and cohort-specific changes in lifestyle 
2 For a review of economics research on the elderly see Hurd, 1990 (17] . 
3 The above argument of course does not apply to preventive health care measures. 
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and consumption patterns (cf. Appendix 1). The research questions raised in this 
paper include: 
1. How to detect changes in social behavior in periods during which the changes 
observed statistically could be either a result of intrinsic changes in preferences, 
or simply of changes in the timing of decisions, or perhaps both. Conversely, 
are there "hidden dynamics" in the process? For instance, changes in the cohort 
composition of the population (aging) may mask fundamental long-term changes 
in preferences and behavior of successive generations. 
2. How to observe and measure behavioral change? Obviously, from the perspective 
of this paper, we emphasize in particular the need for better disaggregated 
longitudinal data series, complementing cross-sectional surveys in such diverse 
domains as consumer expenditures, activity patterns (time budgets), and family 
life cycles. 
3. How to anticipate changes in behavior? Is action following changes in perception, 
or is it the other way around? Whereas interviews and questionnaires can shed 
light on changing values and perceptions of people, their relationship (or 
contradiction) to action also needs attention. In the context of possible behavior 
changes, a closer look at "critical" time periods (e.g., in the household-formation 
stage) and the external (social, material, and natural) "environment" involved 
may give insights about mechanisms of change. 
When emphasizing the concept of cohort in this paper, we acknowledge that there 
are different definitions of a "cohort" (for a discussion see [20, 37]). Traditionally (and 
in this paper), a cohort is a group of people characterized by the same year of birth, 
thus sharing certain experiences in their maturation and socialization. Alternatively, one 
can define cohorts as groups of people experiencing similar (usually dramatic or 
far-reaching) experiences. For instance, a cohort of war participants, a cohort of people 
married in a particular year, or of groups of people experiencing at the same time sudden 
social policy changes (e.g., the abandonment of legalized abortion in Romania). These 
latter cohorts are defined by the date of the event that constitutes the group (cohort). 
As a result, their members can or will be of different ages (i.e., comprising different 
birth cohorts). 
SOME PARADOXES 
The "Baby Boom" as a Surprise in Social Change? 
Ultimately, the most fundamental lifestyle variable is human fertility. The discontinu-
ous rise of the number of children born after World War II at first sight appears as a 
sudden, discontinuous phenomenon of social change. However, was the "baby boom" 
indeed a deeper change in social behavior, in terms that women gave birth to more children 
(over their respective lifetime), or was it just a shift in the timing of births of an otherwise 
unchanged ratio of children per women? 
Ryder [38] in his analysis of trends in American fertility concludes: "most of the 
baby boom would have occurred without any change whatsoever in the numbers of birth 
per women, and most of the decline since the baby boom as well. It is evident that the 
[variation in] numbers of children born were of less importance than their time pattern 
of birth." 
From the above perspective, it becomes clear that there is an ambivalence in 
interpreting the "baby boom" as an example of an intrinsic social change. The observed 
fluctuations in period fertility (measured by the Total Fertility Rate) did not reflect that the 
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average number of children per woman hardly changed, but instead the timing changed. 
Consequently, not the attitudes toward children (family values) in general changed, but 
merely the "technical" aspect of placing the birth of children within a life cycle. This 
does not mean that the "baby boom" is a phantom. The result of changed timing patterns 
(even though perhaps not qualifying as a genuine change in social behavior) resulted in 
significantly more children being born during the "boom" time period, thereby creating 
quantitatively large cohorts, which in turn are felt as possible stresses on the social 
infrastructure like the schooling system or the labor market. 
The Simultaneous Rise of Postmaterialism and the Consumer Society 
An important question in the analysis of possible changes in lifestyle patterns is how 
to get a handle on dimensions, direction, and rates of value changes. Ronald Inglehart 
[ 18) has analyzed longitudinal data of what he considers an indicator of materialism in the 
Japanese society (Figure 2). His analysis reveals clearly that the "decline in materialism" 
observed is, first of all , the result of an intergenerational population replacement. In 
1953, 60% of the age group between 20 and 24 agreed that "money is the most important 
thing" to teach a child, whereas the percentage of agreement in the same age group 
dropped to 18% 25 years later. Consent on this particular educational priority for children 
also dropped with particular age cohorts, but changes were small in COmP.,arison with 
the intergenerational value changes. 
Ironically, this decline of "materialism" was accompanied by an unprecedented 
growth in material welfare that went along with rising incomes and the diffusion of 
automobiles and consumer durables (Figure 3). Data from the Japanese National Survey 
of Family Income and Expenditure [19) indicate that rising consumption is a pervasive 
phenomenon across all generations of the Japanese society. Younger generations (i.e., 
precisely the ones with the most pronounced postmaterialistic values), however, show 
ceteris paribus (i.e., after accounting for differences in income levels and family status) 
a systematically higher propensity to consumption as reflected for instance, in their 
respective higher amounts of consumer credits drawn, or their higher adoption levels of 
consumer durables. 
It seems to us that this paradox of value change in the direction of postmaterialism, 
coinciding with the rising consumption of material goods, points to a deeper dilemma 
in our understanding of social behavioral change. Can we extrapolate changes in 
perceptions and values toward changes in consumer choices and actions? Alternatively, 
does the rise of postmaterialistic values follow the fulfillment of much of the material 
demands of people? 
There is yet another complexity in inferring from people's perceptions and externally 
projected values (e.g., to the interviewer) their ultimate behavior and actions. Perceptions 
and actions may differ . Such gaps have been identified in various fields, for example, 
as difference between subjective and probabilistic assessments of technological risks; 
differences between stated consumption preferences (like alcoholic beverages), and 
commitment toward materials recycling and the analysis of the contents of people's 
trash-cans [32); or between the subjective perceptions of time allocation to different 
activities at the workplace, as opposed to observational records [22), or the mismatch 
between the perception of increasing scarcity of free time [41) with the results of detailed 
inquiries into people's daily activity patterns and time budgets [8, 36). In short, stated 
preferences and values may differ from actual behavior. Such differences in themselves 
contain useful information for social science research, however, they should be kept in 
mind before inferring from stated values and perceptions to ultimate human behavior. 
Critical Periods for Change 
Cohort dynamics as a driving force of social value change holds important 
implications for the analysis of lifestyle patterns. Keyfitz [21) argues that as young people 
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become independent of their parents, they choose a particular way of life: in acquiring 
a given "package" of artifacts (housing, most likely a car, a telephone, a refrigerator, 
stereo equipment, etc.) and in organizing their life in a particular social and spatial-
temporal context as illustrated in the work of Hiigerstrand [12]. Such decisions affect, 
for instance, where to reside and where to work, how to commute in between, and how 
much time is devoted to different activities, such as caring for a child or working in an 
office. Cohorts thus experience important formative phases, as described for instance, 
in approaches like cohort biographies (3]. 
At a later age, lifestyles (arising out of the cumulativeness of many prior decisions) 
are to a large extent settled in particular material, social, and spatial organizational 
settings, which prove difficult (and costly) to change. Of course, dramatic changes in 
lifestyle patterns also occur at later ages, for example, through partner mobility (divorces). 
However, the salient point here is to emphasize that the high transaction costs of lifestyle 
changes are likely to be acceptable only in a relatively limited number of (dramatic) 
instances, leaving lifestyles "locked-in" to a surprising degree in decisions taken on early 
in the biography of a particular age cohort or generation. 
From such a perspective, the freedom to choose or change a certain lifestyle is not 
unlimited, and is also age dependent. The degrees of freedom might indeed be largest 
in the early life phase, where a large number of critical and binding decisions are being 
made, limiting in turn possibilities for changes (at) later (ages). In our view, this is yet 
another line of argument for cohort or generation-specific approaches. 
A similar illustration is provided by a comparison of housing of the elderly between 
cross-sectional (e.g., over family life cycle or over age) and longitudinal, or cohort-specific 
data. Cross-sectional data indicate that elderly couples or single-person households tend 
to live in smaller apartments than their younger counterparts (i.e., couples without 
children, or whose children no longer live with them in the same household, or singles). 
Is this pattern likely to persist in the future? Longitudinal data assembled within the 
socio-economic panel of Germany indicates that the residential mobility of the elderly 
is in fact small, as indicated by the persistence of square meter living space occupied in 
following a particular age cohort over time (42] (see Table 1). Once these age cohorts 
become the elderly of the future, the present differences in living space occupied are likely 
to have disappeared. In turn, such trends will have important implications not only 
for residential energy demand4 , but also for investments in the construction of private 
residences. Again, longitudinal data, which follow changing consumer preferences of 
particular age cohorts over time, can reveal patterns of demand structure changes (or 
perseverance) not apparent from traditional family life-cycle models or cross-sectional 
survey data. 
SOME MORE DILEMMAS 
From the perspective of this paper and the demographic trends of an aging society 
in industrialized countries, one might wonder about the impact of the emergence of a 
new, environmentally more conscious "green" generation in an aging society. Under 
the assumption that changing consumption preferences would primarily be driven by 
generational replacement dynamics, this process would take considerable time to 
noticeably affect the overall level of consumption in a society. Moreover, the quantitative 
effect would remain minimal given the projected "greying." Could distinctive differences 
'For a discussion of residential energy use over the family life cycle see Schipper, et al., 1989 (40) and 
Gladhart et al., 1986 [10) . 
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TABLE 1 
A11e and Cohort Ell'ects In Llvln11 Space per Household 
Living space (square meter) 
Cohort 1984 198S 1986 1987 1988 Age 
1934-1938 102.5 50-54 
1933-1937 IOI.I 
1932-1936 100.5 
1931-1935 99.4 
193(}..1934 101.6 
1929-1933 98.7 55-59 
1928-1932 95 .4 
1927-1931 95 
1926-1930 94.3 
1925-1929 93 .7 
1924-1928 92.2 60-64 
1923-1927 92.4 
1922-1926 91.4 
1921-1925 91.S 
1920-1924 90.5 
1919-1923 87.4 65-69 
1918-1922 84.7 
1917-1921 82.4 
1916-1920 78.6 
1915-1919 80 
1914-1918 79.8 70-74 
1913-1917 76.7 
1912-1916 76. l 
191 l-191S 73.3 
1910-1914 75 .2 
1909-1913 71.2 75-79 
1908-1912 73 .6 
1907-1911 74 
1906-1910 74.9 
1905-1909 72.7 
1904-1908 70.8 80+ 
1903-1907 71.1 
1902-1906 69.5 
1901-1905 70.7 
1900-1904 69.3 
Total 93.3 93 .4 93.5 93 .4 93 .5 50+ 
in consumer behavior between younger and older generations become a source of potential 
social conflict over environmental issues? Under such a scenario the elderly would not 
only be accused of environmentally undesirable conspicuous consumption, but moreover 
of being the source of large intergenerational inequity with respect to the accumulation 
of environmental burdens~ due to their past actions. All told, demographic trends indicate 
the importance of reexamining the assumption that older generations are indeed rather 
immutable in their preferences and consumer behavior, or alternatively whether "green 
behavior" would diffuse (at different rates and levels) across all generations. 
' This in particular applies to long-lived environmentally harmful effluents such as radionuclides or green-
house gases like CO,. For a discussion of intergenerational equity issues in greenhouse gas emissions see Fujii, 
1990 [7] and Griibler and Nakicenovic, 1994 (11]. 
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TABLE 2 
Age-Specific Car Ownership (COS) Rates, by Age Groups and Sex, 1982 and 1990 
(Number of Cars per 1000 of Population) 
Females Males Total 
Age group' 1982 1990 1982 1990 1982 1990 
Under 17 10.6 21.2 42.5 37.1 27.l 29.4 
18-20 55 .7 71.2 200.2 190.6 130.2 132.3 
21-24 237.4 272.0 663 .2 587.l 456.9 432.8 
25-29 327 .7 409.2 863 .3 839.7 603.5 630.6 
30- 34 296.6 417 .3 906.6 934.5 609.4 682.9 
35-39 273 .6 410.4 929.9 954.9 609.8 686.1 
40-44 245 .9 416.0 942.0 1012.7 603.8 720.5 
45-49 204.5 399.5 973 .9 1080.8 598.l 748.8 
50-54 158.3 308.7 933.6 1096.3 549.0 710.1 
55-59 132.1 218.7 848 .5 1008.2 446.2 614.8 
60+ 47.5 100.4 473 .2 712.6 205.0 337.9 
' Age at beginning of the year. 
Another lifestyle aspect deals with migration. How would the aspirations and 
consumer preferences of a young immigrant, coming from a background with low levels 
of material affluence and consumption, compare to postmaterialistic values and ultimately 
to the consumer behavior of the "green generation" in his or her country of destination? 
Again this aspect points to the need to consider heterogeneity in lifestyle patterns, which 
lends itself to the analysis from a generational perspective. 
Not only does the emergence of "green" consumer behavior take time, but also the 
behavior itself takes time, as can be testified by anyone participating in one of the elaborate 
garbage separation and material recycling schemes put in place in a number of European 
cities. In fact, much of the subjective impression of the decline in free time is related to 
a "compression" of active work careers, due to longer education and earlier retirement. 
Thus, although indeed the amount of free time, measured over the entire popula_tion or 
over a person's lifetime, has been increasing, gains during the active work career have been 
much less significant [I]. This is yet another illustration of the importance of considering 
heterogeneity and differentiation of expressions (and constraints) of social behavior. 
Compression of time during active life can be one contributing factor stimulating material 
consumption. Conversely, changes in lifestyle can be contingent on changes in time 
budgets, including inter alia alternative models of the distribution of free time over 
one's lifetime. Perhaps transport modal choices are the best illustration of the critical 
importance both time and time constraints play in consumer decisions. 
An Illustration: the Demographics of Car Ownership 
DATA 
The following illustration of cohort dynamics is based on data (Table 2) on mid-year 
stocks of private-owned passenger cars in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRO) by 
age groups and sex of the owner, for the period 1982 to 1990 (23]6 • Some interpolations 
were required to calculate age specific rates (by single years of age) of what we will call 
' The data also include preliminary de-registered cars, but do not contain cars of owners with unknown 
age and cars of corporate ownership (firm cars). The latter accounts for approximately IOOJo of all cars. Note 
also that this kind of disaggregated data has not been generated before 1981. 
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Fig. 4. Germany: Age-specific COS rates for males, for 1982 and 1990 and selected cohorts. 
car ownership (COS). 7 It is important to emphasize that this variable is perhaps not the 
most useful lifestyle indicator, as it measures ownership rather than actual car usage. In 
the absence of appropriate data, however, we assume the COS variable to be congruent 
with actual car usage. 
The (period) age patterns of COS for the period 1982 to 1990 show a very high 
overall level for males and a significantly lower level for females (Figures 4 and 5). 
Although changes in age-specific COS rates for the period under consideration appear 
to be. minor fo~ males, and are concentrated in the age groups beyond 45, for females 
the magnitude of increase between 1982 and 1990 is significantly higher and, at the same 
time, is more evenly distributed across the age intervals. Smaller increases for males may 
result from their much higher level of COS: In 1990 males in the age group 40 to 59 
even owned, on average, more than one car per male, whereas the highest COS rate for 
women did not exceed 0.42 cars per woman. 
Indications for further changes in both level and age patterns of COS can already 
be derived from the period data, because the observed patterns show significant changes 
in the period 1982 to 1990.8 Obviously, the penetration of car ownership seems to be far 
from stable. The period patterns alone, however, do not reveal clear indications about 
possible trends of changes. For deeper insights into the dynamics of COS changes, 
spline-interpolated COS rates for single-year age groups have been rearranged along 
cohort lines. Figures 4 and 5 show, together with the period observations for 1982 and 
1990, selected cohort trends, suggesting not only that further changes in age-specific COS 
' We used mid-year population estimates for the former FRG for the years 1982 to 1990. The calculated 
central COS rates for males, females, and both sexes combined (total) have been spline-interpolated into single-
year age groups. We assumed car ownership beyond the age of 82 as being negligible, and therefore rates for 
all ages over 85 have been set to zero. 
1 For a discussion of car density and possible trends of the number of cars in Germany, see Moller, 1990 (27]. 
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Fig. 5. Germany: Age-specific COS rates for females, for 1982 and 1990 and selected cohorts. 
patterns are likely to occur, but also some possible trends. For example, it seems obvious 
for today's male and female cohorts to have higher COS rates when they become older 
compared to their predecessors (see male cohorts 1915 and 1920, and female cohorts 
1915 to 1930). It seems also likely, especially for females, that certain cohorts will further 
increase the maximum level of COS, arriving at rates not observed so far. This can easily 
be assumed, for instance, for the 1940 male cohort, and for female cohorts born between 
1960 and 1940. 
TRENDS 
In order to estimate further cohort trends of COS, a simple combination of logistic 
functions were used to model complete cohort age patterns (see Appendix 2). Figures 6 
and 7 show modelled COS trends for selected cohorts. For both males and females there 
is a tendency toward higher COS rates for the elderly, but this is much more pronounced 
for women. There is also some evidence for rather different trends regarding the 
cohort-specific maximum level of COS for males and females, respectively. Although 
for some male cohorts, even a further increase of COS seems to be likely (for those born 
around 1940), for cohorts born after 1950 lower maximum COS rates of about 940 per 
1000 can be assumed (see Figure 6) . The possible decrease for the younger cohorts, 
however, is related to much more uncertainty, as they are far from showing stable trends. 
Furthermore, a possible reduction of COS for younger male cohorts should relate to 
female cohort trends. Although for older cohorts even an increase in female car usage 
probably resulted in increased male car ownership, with changed female attitudes toward 
self-determination and economic independence this might have already changed for 
younger cohorts. For women, the modelled cohort trends strongly suggest further 
increases in COS for almost all cohorts, thus raising the maximum COS level for them 
(Figure 7). We arrived at about 520 per 1000 females as an upper limit. 
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Based on these sets of possible cohort trends, three difference scenarios have been 
estimated for future car ownership in post-unification Germany. It has to be noted that 
we assumed the age-specific COS rates to be similar for East and West Germany, although 
the estimation of the age patterns and levels of COS was based on data for West Germany 
only. The rapid catch-up in East Germany after unification regarding number and density 
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of private cars might serve a confirmation of this hypothesis [43]. Latest data [42] indicate 
that as of January 1993 66.20Jo of all households in East Germany owned a car, compared 
to 73 .90Jo in West Germany. Differences in ownership rates of other consumer durables had 
also practically disappeared by 1993. The only noticeable difference was in single-person 
households (including the elderly), which seems to confirm the cohort perspective of car 
ownership changes adopted here. 
BENCHMARK scenario : Constant 1990 age-specific COS rates . 
TREND scenario: Further cohort dynamics, as described above, have been assumed 
for all cohorts born before 1960 (males) and 1970 (females). The saturation level 
for male COS rates was assumed to decline from 1220 for the cohort 1940 to 940 
for the 1960 born . For females, an increase was assumed from about 450 for the 
cohort 1940 to about 520 for those females born before 1970. For all younger cohorts, 
the COS patterns have been set constant to the 1960 (males) and 1970 (females) 
cohorts. 
GREEN scenario: Based on the TREND scenario, a dramatic reduction in cohort 
males COS have been assumed, starting with those born 1_970 and reaching its lowest 
level of 550 cars per 1000 male population for the cohort 1990. All cohorts born 
after 1990 are assumed to remain on that level. For females, no reduction in COS 
for the GREEN scenario has been assumed. 
Applying the unchanged 1990 COS rates (BENCHMARK) to a population projection 
will reveal those potential effects that are due to demographic changes, namely changes 
in size and the age and sex composition of the population. The TREND scenario serves 
as a conventional wisdom approach, as it assumes simply the continuation of observed 
trends, though derived from cohort dynamics. The GREEN scenario, on the contrary, 
tries to assess implications of a reduction in COS due to several potential reasons, such 
as growing environmental awareness, green taxes (emission taxes), increased car pooling, 
and so on. 
All three COS scenarios have been combined with a recent official population 
projection for Germany [45]. According to it, the German population will decline by 
120Jo or almost 10 million people within the next 4 decades until the year 2030. At the 
same time, the population in Germany will continue to age, for example, the percentage 
of the elderly (aged 60 and older) is expected to rise from 20.40Jo (1990) to about 34.90Jo 
in 2030 or, in other words, the total number of the elderly will increase from 16.3 million 
in 1990 to 24.4 million in 2030. Changes are also expected with respect to the sex ratio 
of the elderly : The 1990 ratio of 168 women to JOO men will decrease to 126 to 100 in 2030. 
The three scenarios imply rather diverse trends_ for the total number of privately 
owned passenger cars in Germany (Table 3). For the BENCHMARK scenario, only a 
little increase in the number of cars (about 1.4 million) is to be expected for the next 
decade, and even a decrease thereafter. In 2030, the total number of cars will be about 
4 million cars less than around 1990, due to the drop in total population by about 10 
million people. 
Assuming further changes in the age patterns of COS as explained above (TREND 
scenario), the number of cars in Germany will increase, but more so in the mid-term 
than in the Jong run. Around the year 2010, about 41.4 million cars have been estimated, 
and about 37.6 million in 2030. As for the GREEN scenario, the total number of cars 
will rise at almost the same path as for the TREND scenario until 2010, but then decreases 
from about 40 million (2010) to about 33 .3 million (2030). 
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TABLE 3 
Projected Number of Private Can by Scenarios, 1990-2030 (In 1000) 
Scenario 
Year BENCHMARK TREND GREEN 
1990" 34,628 34,628 34,628 
2000 35,956 40,206 40,045 
2010 35,449 41,076 39,982 
2020 33,570 40,055 37,250 
2030 30,487 37,560 33,263 
• The 1990 figure for cars in Germany, though a result of our estimation procedure, is very close to t~~t given 
by SHELL (1991) (43), amounting to about 35.3 million cars (30.7 for West Germany and 4.6 m1lhon for 
East Germany). 
TABLE4 
Projected Car Density by Scenarios, 1990-2030 (Cars per 1000 of Population Aged 18 to 85) 
Scenario 
Year BENCHMARK TREND GREEN 
1990 546 546 546 
2000 552 617 615 
2010 553 641 624 
2020 545 650 605 
2030 534 657 582 
TABLES 
Sex Ratio of Car Ownenblp by Scenarios, 1990-2030 (Percentage of Female Car Owners) 
Year BENCHMARK (OJo) TREND (0Jo) GREEN ("lo) 
1990 25 .9 25 .9 25.9 
2000 25 .2 30.7 30.8 
2010 24.5 33 .6 34.5 
2020 23.9 35 .4 38.0 
2030 23.7 36. I 40.7 
The car density (number of cars per 1000 population in the age group 18 to 85) will 
rise for all three scenarios until the year 2010 (Table 4). In the long run, however, car 
density varies widely according to the different scenarios. For the BENCHMARK 
scenario, it will even drop below the current level (1990), mainly due to a decrease in 
the size of the population. The TREND scenario shows a continued increase well beyond 
2010, resulting in 657 cars per 1000 population. As expected, under the GREEN scenario 
the car density will decrease in the long run, but is found well above the initial figure of 
1990. This has to be seen against the background of a declining population, which led 
to the conclusion that the assumed cohort dynamics for the GREEN scenario will 
overcompensate the population decline. 
Except for the BENCHMARK scenario, there is a dominant tendency toward a 
further feminization of the driving (car-owning) population (Table 5). The increase in 
female COS for both the TREND and the GREEN scenario is significant. Although the 
underlying assumptions for the two scenarios are quite different, the level of feminization 
for both of them is not very different, rising from one out of four (1990) to more than 
one out of three (TREND) and even four out of ten (GREEN). 
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TABLE6 
A1e Structure of Private Car Owners by Scenarios, 1990-2030 (In 1000) 
Private cars owned by people in age group 
60+ 
As percentage 
Scenario, year 18-59 Cars of total 
BENCHMARK 
1990 29,323 5,305 15 .3 
2000 29,014 6,942 19.3 
2010 28,247 7,202 20.3 
2020 25 ,750 7,819 23 .3 
2030 21 ,702 8,786 28.8 
TREND 
1990 29,323 5,305 15 .3 
2000 30,904 9,302 23.I 
2010 29,379 11,698 28.5 
2020 26,986 13,068 32.6 
2030 22,703 14,857 39.6 
GREEN 
1990 29,323 5,305 15 .3 
2000 30,743 9,302 23.2 
2010 28,284 11,698 29.3 
2020 24,182 13,068 j5 , I 
2030 18,406 14,857 44.7 
There is a significant tendency toward an increase of older car owners for all scenarios 
(Table 6). Starting with 15.30/o of car owners aged 60 years and older in 1990, this 
percentage is expected to rise to about 290Jo (BENCHMARK), 40% (TREND) or even 
45% (GREEN) until 2030. The rapid aging of the car-owning population is due to two 
facts. First, the subset of the population ages as the total population shifts its age structure 
toward the higher age groups, though not necessarily at the same path and speed. The 
pure effect of demographic aging can be seen in the BENCHMARK scenario, which 
shows almost a doubling of the percentage of older drivers . For the TREND and GREEN 
scenarios, the assumed "aging" of age-specific COS profiles/patterns adds to the 
demographic effect, increasing the aging of the car-owning population even more. One 
can summarize this example as follows: 
• The number of cars in Germany is likely to increase. This can be derived from 
upward trends of cohort COS for many contemporary generations, especially 
pronounced for females. A clear tendency toward a rising stock of private cars 
is limited to the mid-term period until 2000/2010. After 2010, a decline can be 
expected for demographic reasons. The car density, however, is likely to 
increase further. 
• For reasons of comparison, some results of a recent projection regarding private 
cars (43) should be mentioned. The Shell Low scenario9, with a total number of 
cars in 2010 of about 41 million, arrives at almost the same level as our results, 
for both the TREND and the GREEN scenario. The SHELL High scenario10 comes 
up with almost 46 million cars in 2010, or more than 10 million cars more than 
•This more pessimistic scenario is originally labeled "European Community as cblock ." 
10 Originally labelled as "European Community under Change." 
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in 1990. With a car density of almost 700 cars per 1000 population, this could 
challenge traffic and transport enormously. Interpreting this number within the 
framework of age- and sex-specific COS, this would mean either a much higher 
level of female COS, a continuing tendency to have more than just one car for. 
males, or both. Because the Shell scenarios are essentially based on the main 
characteristics of the existing stock of cars - like its age structure - and its past 
trends, those results are not easy to compare with the approach presented here, 
relying on behavioral trends along cohort lines of car owners. 
• Major changes in the age composition of car owners are most likely, resulting from 
cohort trends not easily visible from period observations alone. The underlying 
behavioral changes are especially pronounced for persons aged 60 and over, thus 
reflecting expected major shifts in attitudes among the elderly. These behavioral 
changes of the elderly toward prolonged car ownership- and extended car usage 
in older ages-in combination with the general demographic trend of population 
aging is the main reason for a mid-term increase in the number of cars in Germany, 
despite the fact of a shrinking population. Besides the implication a rising stock 
of cars most likely will have, the aging of the driving population is another issue 
of considerable relevance. Because driving habits and risks of a car accident are also 
age specific, existing safety standards and traffic regulations may be challenged." 
• Even if one assumes a rather dramatic drop in male COS as in the GREEN scenario, 
the total number of private cars is likely to increase further in the medium run, 
and will decline only modestly in the long run. If behavioral changes are solely 
bound to cohorts, as in this illustration, then the penetration of changed attitudes, 
carried by successive cohorts, takes a long time. This indicates that desirable 
changes- the drop of COS for all younger generations- can be compensated by 
changes at the other end of the age span, namely the assumed "stay-active-longer" 
life style of the elderly. 
Dealing with 1Heterogeneity: A Research Agenda 
The preceding discussion was aimed at supporting our argument on the importance 
(and possible interest) of a perspective of generational heterogeneity in social behavior. 
As no single indicator (or model) will be able to capture phenomena of social change in 
an uncontestable way, however, complementary angles of description and analysis are 
required. The inclusion of cohort effects and generational dynamics (as argued for in this 
paper) constitutes, in our viewpoint, a further important step- yet only a complementary 
one-toward a more thorough understanding of social change. 
With respect to empirical indicators, comprehensive coverage of a wide array of 
expressions of social change are required. This should include attitudes and perceptions, 
activities, their possible constraints and information about the social (even the physical) 
context in which values, perceptions, and consumer choices and actions evolve. These 
hitherto often separate areas of investigation have to be linked together so that they 
become more relevant for the study of the social dimension of global change. Measures 
of various demographic characteristics, along with other socioeconomic variables are 
particularly useful for linking these diverse domains together. 
In addition, from the perspective of energy demand and environmental impact 
analysis, the focus of surveys would have to be enlarged to cover not only consumer 
11 For a discussion of the demographics of car accidents see Rallu (1990) [33) . A comprehensive overview 
about elderly drivers is given in Malfetti (1985) [25). See also O'Neil (1992) [30). 
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decisions but also subsequent usage patterns of artifacts. This is because usage patterns 
can have more influence on the overall efficiency for delivering a particular service demand 
than the characteristics of the up-front technological chain (28]. For instance, per 
passenger-kilometer traveled, usage choices (how, and what kind of a car is driven, or 
even not driven at all if the trip 12 is covered by walking and bicycling instead) can matter 
more than the fuel economy of the car, and/or the efficiency of the petroleum supply 
chain including extraction, transport, refining, and distribution. 
Thus, existing data sets and surveys concentrating on areas as diverse as public beliefs 
and attitudes, time budgets, consumer expenditures, socio-demographic panels, traffic 
surveys, etc., have to be combined together, and especially maintained over a sufficiently 
long period to allow study and documentation of processes of change. The examples 
shown in this paper, or identified in the literature, indicate that in individual fields 
longitudinal data already exist, yet up to now were designed primarily to respond to the 
particular needs of specialized fields of study. A necessary precondition for linking 
different surveys and panel data would be to better harmonize and standardize basic 
socio-demographic variables in various surveys. In the meantime, "selective sampling" 
(e.g., concentrating on the early phases of cohort biographies, in which the degrees of 
freedom in the decision space of individuals are largest) could be performed to identify 
possible value changes and newly emerging lifestyle patterns, not yet al?parent at the 
aggregate level. 
The ultimate modeling agenda should aim to link values and perceptions to physical 
expressions of social behavior with its subsequent impacts. We also maintain that such 
models should explicitly include a cohort perspective, perhaps with special emphasis on 
transitional periods such as formation of an independent household, or at retirement. 
Such transitional periods may be considered as "opportunity" windows to change existing 
lifestyle patterns. Below we discuss some (nonexhaustive) points for consideration in 
future analysis and modeling of social change phenomena. 
I. Changes in behavioral "targets" versus changes in timing of behavior. Models 
need to be both dynamic and cohort specific in order to differentiate between 
"changing targets" as opposed to changing "timing" of targeted decisions . Such 
a differentiation becomes especially clear when in retrospect one analyzes whether 
people have changed their consumer choices rather than just the timing of their 
decisions . A hierarchy of phenomena could include: (I) action versus nonaction 
(or adoption decision versus nonadoption) , (2) frequency and intensity of 
actions, (3) timing of decisions/ actions . 
2. Who are the actors? Apart from distinguishing different categories of consumer 
decisions [individual, within family, within particular (formal or informal) social 
groups, or at the level of firms or companies, etc.], care must also be given to 
differentiate "unintended" from planned decisions, and voluntary versus 
contingent type of actions. 13 
3. What are the differences between attitudes and perceptions and actual behavior? 
Here models should attempt to identify the significance of such differences, 
identify reasons for them, and how these in turn influence consumer decisions. 
" Detailed traffic surveys in Europe indicate that up to 50 percent of all trips (most of them by car) cover 
distances of less than 3 km (Socialdata, 1984 (46]; Sammer, 1990 (39]). 
13 Consider for instance the case of an unplanned child, or of an inheritance as examples of unintended 
decisions, or emigration of children (together with their parents) as an example of contingent action. 
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4. Do consumer choices depend on infrastructural support; and what are the 
relationships between values and consumer preferences and the organizational/ 
institutional structure of ownership of consumer products? Here models should 
differentiate between a topology of consumer decisions as affected by different 
(degrees of) infrastructural requirements (independence from support infra-
structures14 versus strong dependence, or intermediary states). In addition, 
different organizational/institutional settings for ownership (e.g., buy versus 
lease models of consumer products) should be differentiated, and the influence 
of value. systems on such ownership preferences be investigated. 
5. Differentiation of decision types into nonrecurrent11 and recurrent decisions. 
This differentiation is similar to those proposed in consumer-products diffusion 
research between first purchase and repeat purchases [24). Recurrent events can 
be further decomposed into sequences of singular events (e.g., the purchase of 
the first, second car, etc.) and linked together via transitional probabilities. 
"Event chains" can serve to derive a topology of changes, considering for 
instance: (temporary or permanent) interruption of event sequences, slow-down 
or acceleration of frequency of sequential events, or changes in the characteristics 
of the event or item involved. 
6. How to deal with limited data? Under the assumption that cohort trends are 
more stable than period trend typologies, various cohort-specific life cycles may 
be constructed. This would be a good way to combine cohort-specific approaches 
with life-cycle analysis. Such a typology may also provide initial models in case 
of limited data availability, for example, only cross-sectional data or limited 
longitudinal data on cohort specific behavior. 
7. Finally on our "shopping list," we would like to see models addressing explicit 
interactions between different agents of (consumer) decisions. Again, the 
reference example is taken from demography, where it is known as the "two-sex 
problem". 16 The two-sex problem arises when male and female populations are 
treated separately in modeling and projections, which is normally the case. 
Considering their interactions requires a different design of data sampling. In 
short, consider the actors rather than statistical proxy variables. Interactions 
between actors in the context of consumer decisions could be modeled, for 
example, via different probabilities depending on types of relationship, types of 
decisions, and kind of interactions between actors. 
Conclusions 
Why do we think the cohort or generational perspective outlined in this paper is 
important? First, it is an important concept for dealing with heterogeneity in consumer 
behavior, enlarging traditional models, in order to observe, model, and discuss possible 
explanations of different "populations" within a population. Second, it can enlarge more 
traditional approaches leading to more differentiated perspectives and enlarging 
methodological pluralism, which we consider of particular importance in the study of 
social change. Third, the approach can also provide hints on the dynamics (and possible 
" In economic theory referred to as network externalities. The utility of adoption of a consumer product 
can depend on the quality of the available support infrastructure (e .g., electricity for a CD-player, a road network 
for an automobile, or standards for video-recording equipment enabling one to share video cassettes. 
" The most classical human "singularity" being of course mortality. 
16 Compare Pollak, 1986 (311; van Imhoff, 1992 (481. 
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constraints) of the diffusion of "green" behaviors and consumption patterns. If indeed 
cohort-specific behavior patterns show greater stability than aggregate period-specific 
data, it may also be easier to anticipate future changes, or to look into more detail into 
"critical periods" of a cohort biography in which various generational "consumption 
paths" are being formed. As such, it can also direct data sampling and modeling toward 
the areas most critical for causing change and identifying trends that may not be visible 
yet at the aggregate level. 
The cohort approach is one (out of other important ones) working hypothesis to 
capture phenomena of social change. In addition, it will be also important to consider 
differences and dispersion within particular cohorts. However, one general problematic 
remains. How does such an "atomized" approach capture the possible reconfiguration 
of the identified groups? It would be naive to assume that people hold extensively to 
"their" generation. However, such a problematic is also inherent in more traditional 
approaches, for instance in household surveys, where people also move between 
categories. Longitudinal panel surveys following the evolution of particular groups and 
a more careful look at "transitionals" are possible research strategies. 
Even if the "atomistic" approach advocated here can release some problems (e.g., 
sweeping generalities) domains of uncertainty remain. In making forecasts (or rather: 
likely scenarios of possible futures), life cycle, income, and cohort-specific analysis all 
combined will still entail inevitable elements of assumptions, and require permanent 
adjustments. This adaptive perspective is important as not all of the future may be 
deducible from the past. But it may enable us to differentiate what changes are either 
rooted in the past or influenced by it from those that come as genuine "surprises," for 
which human history provides many plentiful examples. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Age, Period, and Cohort in Demographic Analyses 
Age, period, and cohort are key concepts in demographic analyses .• Demographic events, such as birth, marriage, 
divorce, moving from one place of residence to another (migration), and ultimately death are characterized by 
three measures : 
Period- The exact date of occurence of the event (measured in terms of calendar years); 
Cohort-the exact date of occurrence of the event-origin, that is the time when the specific group of individuals 
under risk came into existence (represented by the year of birth); 
Age -the seniority of time elapsed since the occurrence of the event-origin (measured in years). 
Because of their considerable explanatory power, age, period, and cohort variables• are often used as proxies 
for underlying causal relationships of the events under study. 
The age variable often is a proxy for physiological states, the amount of exposure to certain influences (as 
social norms or environmental hazards), or stages in the life cycle. Most demographic events show some typical 
age patterns, even across countries and cultures. Human fertility, for instance, not only is physiologically limited 
to the age span of approximately 15 to 50 years, but also shows a well-known age distribution. The force of 
mortality also follows a common age pattern, from relatively high mortality in the first days and months of 
life, through an all-time low around the age of IO, and a geometrically increasing mortality for later age groups. 
This suggests that physiological factors have significant influence. For other demographic events, as migration 
and (first) marriage, characteristic age patterns can be found, too . Regularities in demographic age patterns are 
widely used in so-called "indirect techniques" for dealing with incomplete or defective data [52). 
The period variable can be used as a proxy for all sorts of contemporaneous influences that induce changes 
to all age groups (or cohorts) in a similar way during a certain period of time. True period effect should, therefore, 
work irrespective of former experiences of the cohort (actors). Period effects are assumed by demo-economic 
models, linking the level of say, fertility or (first) marriage during a given period of time to gross national product 
(GNP), individual income, business cycles, labor force participation, and so on. Period effects are easily identified 
when the underlying causes are catastrophic or extraordinary events, such as wars, epidemics, and famines. 
The cohort variable can be taken as a proxy for influences of the past that determine the response or behavior 
of cohorts in the present. The underlying assumption is that earlier events, experienced by the members of a 
cohort, leave an imprint (either physiological or behavioral) on the members of that cohort . In other words, 
lifetime experiences are regarded as important driving forces for cohort response or behavior at later stages of 
life. One example for the relevance of the cohort variable is the fact that the first 15 years of life determine-
at least partially-the health of the cohort for its whole lifetime [4, 5, 50) . Related examples are the exposure 
of groups of people to mining at the coal-face and their subsequent morbidity and mortality patterns. 
Obviously, these three measures are interrelated. A strong period effect, like a war or a famine, might also 
result in cohort effect for certain cohorts. 
•For a comprehensive discussion see Hobcraft and Gilks (1981) [13); Hobcraft, Menken, and Preston (1982) 
[14); Willekens and Baydar (1984) [51). 
•Note that there is a linear relationship between the three measures; Age = Period - Cohort. 
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APPENDIXl 
Mode1Un1 the Cohort Trends 
T. BOTTNER AND A. GR0BLER 
Logistic functions have been chosen for modelling future cohort trends of COS. This function type is assumed · 
to represent the observed cohort trends reasonably, and allows one to operate with saturation levels for COS 
in particular. In brief, the age-specific cohort COS rates - COS(x) - are represented by a combination of two 
logistic functions: 
COS(x) = LOGl(x) - LOG2(x) 
The first function (LOG!) represents the steady increase of COS with age until a certain upper limit (saturation 
level) is achieved, and the second function (LOG2) is modelling the reverse trend at older ages, when car ownership 
decreases. The combination of the two logistic functions is assumed to represent cohort car ownership over the 
life cycle. 
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